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GOLDBERG v. BOONE : GETTING AWAY WITH “MURDER”—
AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT THE ARBITRARY LIMITS
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION QUESTIONING
In Goldberg v. Boone,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland consid-
ered whether inflammatory questions posed to an expert witness on
cross-examination warranted a new trial on the issues of damages and
liability.2  The court held that when an improper line of questioning
played a minor role in the trial and the trial court sustained an objec-
tion that adequately truncated the questioning, its prejudicial impact
did not warrant a new trial.3  In failing to adequately address the stan-
dard by which lawyers may question expert witnesses, the court un-
fairly created a loophole that prejudices defendants by allowing
opposing counsel to disparage experts’ testimony in previous cases
and attribute dishonesty in expert testimony to the current case.4  Ad-
ditionally, the court’s cursory consideration of the need for an appro-
priate curative jury instruction was insufficient and sets a precedent
that gives attorneys free reign to subtly exploit the jury without fear of
a mistrial.5  A more reasonable standard would demand a new trial on
both damages and liability when defendants are prejudiced so severely
that they cannot receive a fair trial by all jurors on all issues.6
I. THE CASE
In 1983, Billy Karl Boone underwent a mastoidectomy7 to remove
a cholesteatoma8 from behind his left ear.9  The physician performing
that procedure erred and accidentally drilled a hole into Boone’s
skull.10  In January 2000, a second cholesteatoma forced Boone to un-
Copyright  2008 by Brigham J. Lundberg.
1. 396 Md. 94, 912 A.2d 698 (2006).
2. Id. at 99, 912 A.2d at 700.
3. Id. at 120, 912 A.2d at 713.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.C.
7. A mastoidectomy is a procedure in which an incision is made behind the ear, al-
lowing the mastoid bone to be opened and infected air cells drained. AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 667–68 (Charles B. Clayman ed., 1989).
8. A cholesteatoma is a rare but serious condition, brought on by a long-term ear
infection, which results in the proliferation of skin cells and accumulation of debris in the
middle ear. Id. at 274.
9. Goldberg v. Boone (Goldberg II), 396 Md. 94, 100, 912 A.2d 698, 701 (2006).
10. Id.
780
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dergo a revisionary mastoidectomy,11 which Seth M. Goldberg, M.D.
performed.12  The day after his surgery, Boone began to have diffi-
culty reading and experienced memory loss.13  Subsequent tests re-
vealed brain hemorrhaging and an opening in Boone’s skull.14
Later in 2000, Boone filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgom-
ery County, claiming that Dr. Goldberg15 acted negligently by: punc-
turing his brain during surgery, failing to inform him that the
procedure was high risk and could result in permanent brain damage,
and neglecting to advise him that there were more experienced sur-
geons in the area who could perform the procedure.16  At trial, Boone
requested that the court give the jury an instruction on informed con-
sent.17  Dr. Goldberg opposed the informed consent jury instruction
and claimed that Boone had failed to show causation because there
was no evidence that Boone would have opted out of the procedure
even if Dr. Goldberg had disclosed the information about which
Boone complained.18
During the trial, Dr. Goldberg moved for a mistrial, asserting two
reasons why Boone’s cross examination of Dr. Goldberg’s expert wit-
ness, neuropsychologist David Schretlen, was improper, inflammatory,
and prejudicial.19  First, Boone sought to peg Dr. Schretlen as a paid
minimizer, or someone who was willing to testify more favorably, re-
gardless of objective facts, for whichever side paid him.20  Second,
while asking Dr. Schretlen about other cases in which he had testified
as an expert, Boone referred to Dr. Schretlen’s role in the 2002 Wash-
ington, D.C. sniper trial.21  Because the court did not consider that
11. “A ‘revisionary’ mastoidectomy is a repeated mastoidectomy.” Id. at 101 n.6, 912
A.2d at 702 n.6 (citing WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1067 (11th ed. 2005)).
12. Id. at 101, 912 A.2d at 701–02.
13. Id., 912 A.2d at 702.
14. Id.
15. Boone also brought suit against Dr. Goldberg’s corporation, Aesthetic Facial Sur-
gery Center of Rockville, Ltd.  Goldberg v. Boone (Goldberg I), 167 Md. App. 410, 414 n.1,
893 A.2d 625, 627 n.1 (Ct. Spec. App. 2006).  Both parties will be referred to as “Dr.
Goldberg.”
16. Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 101–02, 912 A.2d at 702.
17. Id. at 102, 912 A.2d at 702.  In particular, Boone desired the informed consent jury
instruction on both the high risk and the alternative surgeon issues. Id. at 101–02, 912
A.2d at 702.
18. Id. at 107, 912 A.2d at 705.  Dr. Goldberg argued alternatively that even if Boone
had gone to a more experienced surgeon, there was no evidence to prove he would have,
more likely than not, attained better results. Id.
19. Id. at 106, 912 A.2d at 704–05.
20. Id. at 105–06, 912 A.2d at 704.
21. Id. at 106, 912 A.2d at 704–05.  The sniper case to which Boone referred involved
Lee Boyd Malvo, one of two men responsible for the Washington, D.C. beltway sniper
shootings that took place in October 2002. Goldberg I, 167 Md. App. 410, 434 n.9, 893 A.2d
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questioning sufficiently prejudicial, it denied Dr. Goldberg’s motion
for a mistrial.22  Following a jury trial, the circuit court entered judg-
625, 639 n.9 (Ct. Spec. App. 2006).  In response, Boone’s counsel stated that he was simply
trying to impeach Dr. Schretlen’s credibility by demonstrating that he was a minimizer or
maximizer, and his reference to the sniper case occurred only because it was one of Dr.
Schretlen’s most recent trials. Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 106–07, 912 A.2d at 705.
22. Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 107, 912 A.2d at 705.  Boone’s cross-examination of Dr.
Schretlen proceeded as follows:
[COUNSEL FOR MR. BOONE]: Now, other people who have talked with Mr.
Boone or talked about Mr. Boone or given therapy to Mr. Boone have talked
about him not being aware, not having full insight into the degree of the anger
that he has or the anger that he expresses.  Wouldn’t you agree that is fairly com-
mon in these kinds of patients, that they are not fully, they don’t have full insight
into all of their problems?
SCHRETLEN: I wouldn’t say that.  I mean, it happens, but I’m not, (a) I’m not
sure that’s the case in this case at all, and (b) it certainly is, yeah, it’s common, but
it’s also commonly not the case—
* * *
[COUNSEL FOR MR. BOONE]: Okay.  I mean, you are hired here basically as a
minimizer, aren’t you?
[COUNSEL FOR DR. GOLDBERG]: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
* * *
[COUNSEL FOR MR. BOONE]: Okay.  Now, the very last case you testified, you
testified against my client, Sharon Burke.  You said she had a mild problem, too.
Do you remember that?
* * *
[COUNSEL FOR MR. BOONE]: She flunked 55 out of 60 tests you gave her and
still you called it a “mild” problem.  Don’t you recall that?
SCHRETLEN: I recall that I diagnosed her with dementia, [Counsel for Mr.
Boone].
[COUNSEL FOR MR. BOONE]: Sir, don’t you remember you used the word
“mild” in your courtroom testimony?
* * *
SCHRETLEN: I said it was milder than some, as you may recall, but that she had a
moderately severe dementia syndrome.
* * *
[COUNSEL FOR MR. BOONE]: Now, the case before that, that you testified in
court, was a criminal case, right?
SCHRETLEN: I’m not sure.
[COUNSEL FOR MR. BOONE]: Okay.  Well, you testified [sic] a young man,
about 18 years old, and you did a daylong [sic] battery of tests on him and he
tested abnormal in one or two tests, right?
SCHRETLEN: Oh, yes.  I know who you are speaking of.
[COUNSEL FOR MR. BOONE]: Okay.  He was only abnormal in one or two
tests?
SCHRETLEN: That’s right.
[COUNSEL FOR MR. BOONE]: Okay.  And that young man, you were willing to
come into court and testify that he might have been brainwashed into murdering
10 people in the sniper thing, isn’t that true?
[COUNSEL FOR DR. GOLDBERG]: Objection, Your Honor.
SCHRETLEN: That is absolutely incorrect and outrageous.
THE COURT: Sustained.
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ment in favor of Boone, awarding him $943,000 for loss of earning
capacity, medical expenses, and non-economic damages.23  Dr.
Goldberg appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland and
argued that the circuit court had erred in submitting an informed
consent instruction to the jury and in not granting a mistrial for the
inflammatory questions posed to his expert witness.24
The Court of Special Appeals analyzed the validity of the in-
formed consent claim and examined the prejudicial effect of the
sniper line of questioning on the negligence claim.25  First, the court
found that an informed consent action presents a jury issue only if
there is evidence that the doctor failed to explain the benefits and
risks of an “affirmative violation of the patient’s physical integrity,”
like surgery, injections, or other treatment.26  Moreover, the court
stated that “treatment,” for consent purposes, refers to the type of pro-
cedure and manner in which it is performed, rather than to the per-
son performing it.27  Therefore, the court determined that Dr.
Goldberg had not breached his duty to obtain informed consent from
Boone by not volunteering the fact that there were more seasoned
surgeons available in the area.28
Second, the court examined other Maryland cases that pertained
to unfair questioning of witnesses and concluded that Dr. Goldberg
was improperly prejudiced by questions that tied Dr. Schretlen to Lee
Boyd Malvo.29  The Court of Special Appeals ultimately held that al-
though Dr. Goldberg deserved post-trial relief, he was only entitled to
a new trial on damages because the questioning likely affected only
the amount of damages awarded and not the liability assessed.30  Addi-
tionally, the court ruled that although Boone’s informed consent
claim should not have been presented to the jury, the judgment in
Id. at 103–05, 912 A.2d at 703–04.
23. Id. at 109, 912 A.2d at 706–07.  Following this decision, Dr. Goldberg filed motions
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (or, alternatively, for a new trial) and for a new
trial on the issue of future medical damages (or, alternatively, for appointment of a conser-
vator). Id. at 109–10, 912 A.2d at 707.  The court denied both motions. Id. at 110, 912
A.2d at 707.
24. Goldberg I, 167 Md. App. at 416, 893 A.2d at 628 (five additional issues were ap-
pealed and considered by the court).
25. Id. at 422–38, 893 A.2d at 632–41.
26. Id. at 423, 893 A.2d at 632 (citing Arrabal v. Crew-Taylor, 159 Md. App. 668, 683,
862 A.2d 431, 439 (Ct. Spec. App. 2004)).
27. Id. at 424, 893 A.2d at 633 (quoting Mitchell v. Kayem, 54 S.W.3d 775, 781 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2001)).
28. Id. at 425, 893 A.2d at 633–34.
29. Id. at 437, 893 A.2d at 641.
30. Id. at 438, 893 A.2d at 641.
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favor of Boone on the negligence claim was correct.31  Therefore, the
court vacated the judgment on the negligence claim, reversed the
judgment on the informed consent claim, and remanded the case to
the circuit court for a new trial on the issue of damages.32
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether the
prejudicial statements made during the cross examination of Dr.
Goldberg’s expert witness warranted a new trial on solely the issue of
damages, and not liability.33  The court also granted certiorari to de-
termine whether the improper submission of an informed consent in-
struction to the jury warranted a new trial on the issue of negligence.34
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Court of Appeals has established that an expert witness’s mo-
tives, interests, and prejudices are generally appropriate subjects for
questioning.35  When considering the appropriateness of such ques-
tioning, if the trial court makes a decision about a motion for mistrial
and the effect of improper questioning, an appellate court will reverse
its determinations only in extreme circumstances.36  Recently, the
Court of Appeals has begun to grant motions for mistrial in cases
where improper questioning produced prejudice and unfairly influ-
enced the trial.37  In those cases where the prejudice extends only to
an isolated issue, the court may order a partial new trial to address
that specific issue.38
A. Questions to an Expert Witness About Interests, Motives,
Inclinations, and Prejudices Are Appropriate
In Maryland, questions on cross examination may only relate to
the subject matter of the direct examination or the credibility of the
witness.39  The court will control the questioning to ensure the truth is
ascertained, the court’s time is not wasted, and the witness is not
31. Id. at 417, 893 A.2d at 628–29.
32. Id., 893 A.2d at 629.
33. Goldberg II, 396 Md. 94, 99–100, 912 A.2d 698, 700–01 (2006).
34. Id.  This Note will focus solely on the issue of the prejudicial statements made dur-
ing cross examination, without addressing the court’s analysis of the informed consent
instruction.
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. See infra Part II.B.1.
37. See infra Part II.B.2.
38. See infra Part II.C.
39. MD. R. 5-611(b)(1).  The court may allow questioning on other matters at its own
discretion. Id.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-4\MLR404.txt unknown Seq: 6 15-MAY-08 9:24
2008] GOLDBERG V. BOONE 785
harassed or unduly embarrassed.40  Nevertheless, a witness’s credibil-
ity may be challenged on cross-examination to show his bias,
prejudice, interest in the trial’s outcome, or motive to give inaccurate
testimony.41
Long before the Maryland Rules of Evidence were adopted,42 Ma-
ryland courts held that queries about an expert witness’s interests,
preferences, influences, and biases were suitable topics for question-
ing on cross-examination.43  In particular, a cross-examiner may ask
an expert witness about his employment history and the compensa-
tion he earns for testifying, if such questions will show that the witness
is biased or has an interest in the outcome of the trial.44
For instance, in Mezzanotte Construction Co. v. Gibons,45 the Court
of Appeals held that it is appropriate on cross-examination to ask
about an expert witness’s pay, as such questioning might reveal moti-
vation or bias of the witness and thus impact his credibility.46  In
Gibons, an expert witness testified as to the value of a quantity of tim-
ber that the defendant had illegally cut from the plaintiff’s tract of
land.47  In so doing, the expert witness admitted that he had already
been paid for evaluating the removed timber and would be compen-
sated for his testimony, although the exact amount of compensation
had yet to be fixed.48  Because the outcome of the case would not
affect the amount of the expert witness’s compensation, the court
found that the jury could consider the amount of such payment.49
Forty years later, in Wrobleski v. deLara,50 the Court of Appeals
ruled that an expert witness can be questioned not only about the
compensation that he would receive for the current case, but also
about the total amount of compensation earned as an expert witness
in the previous year.51  In that case, Linda Wrobleski brought a medi-
40. Id. 5-611(a); see also id. 5-102 (stating that Maryland’s evidentiary rules are intended
“to secure fairness in administration, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and pro-
mote the . . . development of the law of evidence [so] that the truth may be ascertained
and proceedings justly determined”).
41. Id. 5-616(a)(4).
42. The current evidentiary rules in Maryland were approved in 1993 and took effect
on July 1, 1994. Id. T.5.
43. Wise v. Ackerman, 76 Md. 375, 394, 25 A. 424, 427 (1892).
44. Ager v. Balt. Transit Co., 213 Md. 414, 427–28, 132 A.2d 469, 476–77 (1957).
45. 219 Md. 178, 148 A.2d 399 (1959).
46. Id. at 181, 148 A.2d at 401–02.
47. Id. at 180, 148 A.2d at 401.
48. Id. at 181, 148 A.2d at 401.
49. Id., 148 A.2d at 401–02.
50. 353 Md. 509, 727 A.2d 930 (1999).
51. Id. at 517, 727 A.2d at 933–34.
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cal malpractice suit against Dr. deLara, alleging that her small intes-
tine had been negligently damaged during a procedure.52
Wrobleski’s expert witness stated that he had previously testified for
nearly sixty medical malpractice plaintiffs, twenty-five of whom had
been clients of Wrobleski’s attorney.53  He further acknowledged that
he had earned $30,000 to $50,000 from testifying as an expert in the
past year, and that eighty percent of his appearances had been on
behalf of plaintiffs.54
In reaching its conclusion, the Wrobleski court explained several
related questions that it considered appropriate to use to reveal an
expert witness’s bias.55  Specifically, opposing counsel may ask how
much an expert witness will be paid for a given case, how frequently
he testifies in similar cases, how much income he earns as an expert
witness, and what percentage of his total income is generated through
expert witness testimony.56  Moreover, the court found it permissible
to inquire into whether an expert witness is hired frequently by a par-
ticular party, firm, or attorney, and whether the expert normally testi-
fies for plaintiffs or defendants.57
B. Irrelevant Evidence, Such As Incendiary Comments and Questions,
Can Produce a Prejudice So Substantial as to Outweigh the
Probative Value of the Evidence
When an inquiry made during cross-examination is appropriate,
under the Maryland Rules, such evidence is considered relevant (and
thus permissible) if it tends to make the existence of any material fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.58  Even
if the evidence is relevant, it may still be excluded by the court if the
danger of unfair prejudice resulting from its admission substantially
outweighs its probative value.59
52. Id. at 511, 727 A.2d at 931.
53. Id. at 513, 727 A.2d at 931.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 517–18, 727 A.2d at 933–34.
56. Id. at 517, 727 A.2d at 933–34.
57. Id.
58. MD. R. 5-401.
59. Id. 5-403.
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1. The Trial Judge’s Decision Concerning Admissibility of Evidence
and Appropriateness of Relief when Improper Evidence Is
Introduced Will Only Be Reversed in Exceptional Cases
In Maryland, the trial judge decides whether evidence is admissi-
ble.60  Although evidence is typically approved by a judge in a prelimi-
nary hearing, inadmissible evidence may still occasionally be
introduced at trial.61  When improper, prejudicial comments are
made to witnesses at trial, opposing counsel will customarily object,
seek a curative jury instruction,62 or, in extreme cases, move for a mis-
trial.63  The trial judge must then weigh the damage done by the inap-
propriate questioning and the sufficiency of a remedial instruction
that the jury disregard the remark.64  The court’s response to the un-
fair comments is within the power of the trial judge, whose judgment
will only be reversed when there is a clear abuse of discretion.65
In DeMay v. Carper,66 the Court of Appeals noted that normally
the trial judge remedies counsel’s inappropriate comments, state-
ments, or arguments by reproof.67  Moreover, an appellate court will
reverse a trial judge’s choice of cure, and her decision as to its effect
upon the jury, only in exceptional, blatant cases.68  Appellate courts
defer to trial judges’ decisions because they are in the best position to
evaluate the level of prejudice at trial.69
60. Id. 5-104(a).
61. See, e.g., Lai v. Sagle, 373 Md. 306, 318, 818 A.2d 237, 244 (2003) (finding highly
prejudicial remarks blurted out by an attorney during opening argument of trial
inadmissible).
62. A curative instruction may include informing the jury that the question was im-
proper, striking the remark, or requiring the jury to disregard it.  Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md.
404, 423–24, 326 A.2d 707, 720 (1974).
63. See Lai, 373 Md. at 318, 818 A.2d at 244 (noting that when facts introduced as
evidence are plainly inadmissible and highly prejudicial a mistrial is one of the primary
remedies considered).
64. See generally Tierco Md., Inc. v. Williams, 381 Md. 378, 413–14, 849 A.2d 504,
525–26 (2004) (citations omitted) (detailing the need for the trial judge to gauge the level
of prejudice and respond with an equivalent cure).
65. Lai, 373 Md. at 317, 818 A.2d at 244 (quoting Med. Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc’y of Md. v.
Evans, 350 Md. 1, 19, 622 A.2d 103, 112 (1993)).
66. 247 Md. 535, 233 A.2d 765 (1967).
67. Id. at 540, 233 A.2d at 768.  Usually, the judge is allowed her choice of methods to
assure a fair, unprejudiced, and impartial jury. Id.
68. Id.
69. State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 278, 604 A.2d 489, 493 (1992).  Specifically, the trial
judge “has h[er] finger on the pulse of the trial,” can observe the demeanor of witnesses,
the reactions of jurors, and perceive matters not discernible from the record alone. Id.; see
also Hickman v. State, 76 Md. App. 111, 120, 543 A.2d 870, 875 (Ct. Spec. App. 1988)
(holding that when an improper question is posed, appellate courts should defer to the
trial court’s judgment because the trial court can best evaluate the effect of the question
on the jury).
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In Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett,70 the Court of Appeals
considered an appeal of a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion
for mistrial in an asbestos case.71  Counsel for the three plaintiff em-
ployees affected by the asbestos analogized the defendants to
criminals, villains, and even Nazis, claiming that the defendants’ ac-
tions afflicted others with mesothelioma, a condition that “stalked” its
victims, took them “hostage,” and “robbed” them of their lives.72  In
light of the defendants’ many objections to such statements, the trial
court instructed the jury to disregard the improper comments during
deliberations.73
The Garrett court considered whether a blatant case existed war-
ranting a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to grant a mistrial.74  First, the court explained, it had to determine
whether, and to what extent, the moving party was prejudiced by the
opposing party’s questions, statements, or conduct.75  Second, the
court decided whether the curative measures that the trial judge im-
plemented were sufficient to overcome the prejudice, or whether the
prejudice was so damaging, in spite of the curative measures, that the
moving party was denied a fair trial.76  Ultimately, the court character-
ized the question as one of prejudice to the moving party.77
In Garrett, the court found that the plaintiffs’ counsel’s remarks
were unduly inflammatory and improper.78  Nevertheless, because the
trial judge made two separate curative instructions and the defendants
did not request a mistrial at the proper time, the court held that the
trial judge had not abused his discretion in failing to grant a mis-
trial.79  The court’s balancing of the prejudice to the defendants
against the curative measure was influenced by the fact that the trial
had consumed an enormous amount of resources and lasted four
months.80  However, the court emphasized that applying the same
analysis to an unfairly prejudicial argument in a different case could
result in a mistrial in the future.81
70. 343 Md. 500, 682 A.2d 1143 (1996).
71. Id. at 505, 513, 682 A.2d at 1145, 1149.
72. Id. at 515, 682 A.2d at 1150 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 516, 682 A.2d at 1150–51.
74. Id. at 518, 682 A.2d at 1151.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 407, 667 A.2d 116, 151–52
(1995)).
77. Id. (citing Rainville v. State, 328 Md. 398, 408, 614 A.2d 949, 953 (1992)).
78. Id., 682 A.2d at 1152.
79. Id. at 519, 682 A.2d at 1152.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 519–20, 682 A.2d at 1152.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-4\MLR404.txt unknown Seq: 10 15-MAY-08 9:24
2008] GOLDBERG V. BOONE 789
2. A Mistrial Is Proper when Inappropriate Questions and Comments
Produce a Prejudice So Pervasive that the Trial Can No
Longer Be Considered Fair
The Court of Appeals has found that the prejudice caused by ob-
jectionable questions or comments can become so extreme as to war-
rant a mistrial.  In Guesfeird v. State,82 the Court of Appeals reviewed a
child abuse case in which a child witness referred to a polygraph test
while testifying.83  Because the results of lie detector tests, as well as
the fact of taking such a test, are inadmissible, the defense moved for
mistrial, fearing that the prejudice of the jury’s assumption that the
child had passed the polygraph test would outweigh any curative in-
struction the trial court could give.84
The Guesfeird court noted several factors that are relevant in de-
termining the prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence.85  These fac-
tors include: whether counsel made the comment repeatedly or as a
single, isolated statement; whether the reference was premeditated or
inadvertent; whether the witness questioned was the principal witness
upon whose testimony the entire case depended; whether credibility
was a crucial issue; and whether the jury could draw an inference from
the comment.86  The court made clear that no single factor would be
dispositive in any given case.87  As such, these factors are not a test,
but a non-exhaustive list of elements that can help judges determine
the prejudicial impact of improper comments.88  In Guesfeird, even
though the comment was a single, isolated statement, because the
court found that the credibility of the witness was important and the
jury could infer from the polygraph comment that the witness was be-
lievable, the prejudice to the defendant was sufficient to warrant a
mistrial.89
In 1993, in Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland v.
Evans,90 a plaintiff’s counsel questioned a health insurance claims
manager about his bad-faith failure to settle a medical malpractice suit
in a previous case.91  The court found this cross-examination im-
82. 300 Md. 653, 480 A.2d 800 (1984).
83. Id. at 656, 480 A.2d at 801–02.
84. Id. at 657–58, 480 A.2d at 802–03.
85. Id. at 659, 480 A.2d at 803.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 666–67, 480 A.2d at 807.
90. 330 Md. 1, 622 A.2d 103 (1993).
91. Id. at 16–17, 622 A.2d at 110–11.  The previous case mentioned involved a doctor
who negligently removed the ovaries and uterus of a young woman. Id., 622 A.2d at 110.
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proper and irrelevant because it was merely meant to harass and em-
barrass the witness and obscure the real issue at trial.92  The court
held that the prejudice from such cross-examination eclipsed the
judge’s cautionary instruction93 to the jurors about being fair and im-
partial, and that the trial court had therefore abused its discretion by
denying the motion for mistrial.94
Ten years later, in Lai v. Sagle,95 the court stated that plaintiff’s
counsel’s reference to a defendant’s five previous medical malpractice
lawsuits was prejudicial because it had no probative value and would
only excite and mislead the jury.96  After comparing the improper
comment to the admission of evidence of prior arrests in a criminal
case, the court held that because the statement was highly prejudicial
and would customarily result in a mistrial in a comparable criminal
case, no curative instruction could overcome the harm to the
defendant.97
Shortly thereafter, in Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williams,98 the court
found that repeated comments about race and discrimination during
a trial in which racial discrimination was not alleged were inappropri-
ate.99  The court noted that it has universally condemned irrelevant
and unjustified statements calculated to arouse racial, national, or re-
ligious prejudice.100  On appeal, the court held that the plaintiff used
race to overshadow the material issues and, thus, the defendant’s mo-
tion for a new trial should have been granted.101
Specifically, plaintiff’s counsel asked defendant’s expert witness claims manager why he
valued the removal of the woman’s reproductive organs at $23,000 when the jury awarded
the woman $1.4 million, or $400,000 in excess of the insurance policy limits. Id. at 17, 622
A.2d at 110.
92. Id. at 22, 622 A.2d at 113.
93. The trial judge urged jurors to be fair and impartial toward the evidence
presented. Id. at 18 n.13, 622 A.2d at 111 n.13.
94. Id. at 24, 622 A.2d at 114.
95. 373 Md. 306, 818 A.2d 237 (2003).
96. Id. at 322, 818 A.2d at 247.
97. Id. at 324–25, 818 A.2d at 248–49.
98. 381 Md. 378, 849 A.2d 504 (2004).
99. Id. at 409, 849 A.2d at 523 (citing C.R. McCorkle, Annotation, Statement by Counsel
Relating to Race, Nationality, or Religion in Civil Actions as Prejudicial, 99 A.L.R.2D 1249, 1254
(1965)).
100. Id.  Some courts have held that an improper reference to hot-button issues like
race, nationality, and religion is per se grounds for a mistrial. See, e.g., Tex. Employers’ Ins.
Ass’n v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Tex. App. 1990) (“We hold that incurable revers-
ible error occurs whenever any attorney suggests, either openly or with subtlety and finesse,
that a jury feel solidarity with or animus toward a litigant or a witness because of race or
ethnicity.”).
101. Tierco Md., 381 Md. at 411, 414, 849 A.2d at 524, 526.
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C. A Partial New Trial Should Be Granted Only when It Is Clear that
the Prejudice Did Not Affect All Issues
Within the past decade, Maryland courts have found that a partial
new trial may only be ordered if it is obvious that the effect of the
prejudicial error at trial did not extend to all the issues tried.102  In
Stickley v. Chisholm,103 the Court of Special Appeals stated that retrial
on a limited issue would be allowed “‘if that issue c[ould] be sepa-
rately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as could amount to
a denial of a fair trial.’”104  However, it was unclear whether an erro-
neous jury instruction would only adversely affect the deliberation on
the issue of causation.105  Because the negligence and proximate
cause issues related to the malpractice were “inextricably intertwined,”
the court ordered a new trial.106
Indeed, if the prejudice or incendiary nature of a comment
merely taints the award of damages and not the assessment of liability,
courts may respond by ordering a remittitur or a new trial on the issue
of damages alone.107  If, however, there is a reasonable probability
that the improper comment influenced both the damages and the lia-
bility issues, a new trial is granted on both issues.108
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Goldberg v. Boone, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
of the Court of Special Appeals and iterated two key holdings.109
First, the court held that the improper questioning about the sniper
case did not sufficiently prejudice the case so as to warrant a new trial
because: (1) the trial court appropriately curtailed its prejudicial ef-
fect by sustaining the objection to it; and (2) the comment played
only a minor role in the trial.110  Second, because the jury instruction
on informed consent was a correct exposition of the law and was ap-
102. Stickley v. Chisholm, 136 Md. App. 305, 317, 765 A.2d 662, 669 (Ct. Spec. App.
2001) (quoting McBride v. Huckins, 81 A. 528, 531–32 (N.H. 1911)).
103. 136 Md. App. 305, 765 A.2d 662 (Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
104. Id. at 317, 765 A.2d at 669 (quoting Gyerman v. U.S. Lines Co., 498 P.2d 1043, 1054
(Cal. 1972)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 317–18, 765 A.2d at 669–70.
107. See Pingatore v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 419 F.2d 1138, 1142–43 (6th Cir. 1969)
(ordering a new trial solely on the issue of damages).
108. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 282–83 (5th Cir. 1975).
109. Goldberg II, 396 Md. 94, 120–21, 912 A.2d 698, 713 (2006).
110. Id. at 120, 912 A.2d at 713.
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plicable given the evidence before the court, the court determined
that it was allowable.111
Writing for the majority, Judge Battaglia first summarized the law
regarding allowable questions for cross examination and explained
the doctrine of informed consent.112  She stated that counsel may
question an expert about compensation received for testifying in or-
der to reveal bias.113  Furthermore, the court noted that to overturn a
denial of a motion for mistrial, Boone’s conduct or words must have
so prejudiced Dr. Goldberg that he could not have received a fair trial
despite any curative measures that the trial judge took.114  Because
cross-examination inquiries as to an expert witness’s income, motives,
interests, and prejudices are allowable, the court determined that the
paid minimizer question was appropriate.115  Additionally, the court
stated that the sniper comment, although improper, was not suffi-
ciently prejudicial to warrant a new trial on the issue of liability be-
cause Boone’s counsel only said it once, the trial judge quickly
truncated it, and no party repeated it before the jury.116
With regard to the informed consent issue, the court held that,
because there was no bright-line rule to determine how much doctor-
patient disclosure was required to gain consent to perform a proce-
dure, such an analysis would depend on what each patient considered
material in making a decision to undergo treatment.117  Because each
patient would consider various factors material to making a treatment
decision, the court determined that whether a reasonable person in
Boone’s position would have submitted to a mastoidectomy at the
hands of Dr. Goldberg was an issue of fact for the jury to decide.118
111. Id. at 121, 912 A.2d at 713.
112. See generally id. at 114–27, 912 A.2d at 709–17.
113. Id. at 116, 912 A.2d at 710.
114. Id. at 115, 912 A.2d at 710.
115. Id. at 117, 912 A.2d at 711.
116. Id. at 120, 912 A.2d at 713.  Moreover, the court found the sniper question distin-
guishable from the cases that involved comments that either were incessantly repeated or
alluded to inadmissible evidence. Id. at 118–20, 912 A.2d at 712–13 (citing Tierco Md.,
Inc. v. Williams, 381 Md. 378, 414, 849 A.2d 504, 526 (2004) (holding that reference to
race and discrimination to overwhelm the real issues at hand was prejudicial, and finding
refusal to grant a new trial an abuse of discretion); Lai v. Sagle, 373 Md. 306, 322, 818 A.2d
237, 247 (2003) (noting that reference to a doctor’s five previous malpractice suits had no
probative value and was prejudicial); Med. Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc’y of Md. v. Evans, 330 Md. 1,
22, 24, 622 A.2d 103, 113–14 (1993) (stating that questioning about a defendant’s irrele-
vant prior bad acts served only to obscure the real issues and was therefore inadmissible)).
117. Id. at 123, 912 A.2d at 714 (quoting Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 443–44, 379 A.2d
1014, 1022 (1977)).
118. Id. at 126–27, 912 A.2d at 717.
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In her dissent, Judge Raker, joined by Chief Judge Bell and Judge
Greene, argued that the decision of the circuit court should have
been reversed and that Dr. Goldberg should have been allowed a new
trial on both liability and damages.119  Judge Raker found it impermis-
sible to question an expert witness about his opinion in cases unre-
lated to the litigation.120  As further support for her conclusion, she
contended that when a cross-examiner tries to show that an expert has
minimized injury, there is no way for the party calling the expert to
show otherwise, except to have a burdensome “trial within a trial.”121
Because Boone’s questioning sought to expose Dr. Schretlen’s past
minimizing testimony, Judge Raker asserted that the resultant unfair
prejudice warranted a new trial on both liability and damages.122
IV. ANALYSIS
In Goldberg v. Boone, the Court of Appeals held that although the
plaintiff’s questioning of the defendant’s expert witness was improper,
it did not warrant a new trial on the issue of liability because its preju-
dicial effect was curtailed by the trial court, and the comment did not
play a major role in the trial.123  In so holding, the court failed to
sufficiently analyze the extent of the impropriety of questions posed to
Dr. Schretlen about his status as an expert witness.124  The court also
gave insufficient attention to the trial court’s inadequate effort to cure
the prejudice that the questioning caused.125  In cases involving such a
blatant use of inflammatory comments, public policy and fairness con-
siderations demand that the court grant a motion for a new trial on
the issues of both damages and liability.126
A. The Goldberg Court Failed to Properly Apply Precedent that
Proscribes the Asking of Any Question Meant to Harass an
Expert Witness or Prejudicially Excite the Jury
The Goldberg court erred in failing to distinguish a question about
compensation for expert witness testimony, which intends to show
bias, from a question that expressly alleges that the expert witness is a
119. Id. at 130, 912 A.2d at 719 (Raker, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 131–32, 912 A.2d at 719–20.
121. See id. at 132, 912 A.2d at 720 (citing Pappas v. Fronczak, 618 N.E.2d 878, 884 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (“[S]ubtrials on issues remote from the subject of the lawsuit should be
avoided . . . .”)).
122. Id. at 132–33, 912 A.2d at 720.
123. Id. at 120, 912 A.2d at 713 (majority opinion).
124. See infra Part IV.A.
125. See infra Part IV.B.
126. See infra Part IV.C.
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paid minimizer, which intends to show wrongdoing.127  During the
questioning of an expert witness, it is a common and acceptable prac-
tice for a cross-examiner to attempt to demonstrate that the witness’s
testimony is biased because he is a professional expert witness, or a
“hired gun.”128  Indeed, under past precedent,129 the Goldberg court
properly decided that counsel for Boone could inquire as to Dr.
Schretlen’s compensation in this case and in previous cases.130
However, by allowing Boone to insinuate that Dr. Schretlen was
more than a simple “hired gun,” the court improperly allowed Dr.
Schretlen to be harassed and put Dr. Goldberg’s case at an extreme
disadvantage.131  Although Boone intended to suggest that Dr.
Schretlen was biased because he would testify for the side that paid
him, which would have been appropriate,132 his question was actually
phrased to show that Dr. Schretlen was a habitual minimizer.133  Such
a question allowed the jury to infer that Dr. Schretlen’s actions and
testimony were consistently biased, improper, and motivated by
127. Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 130–31, 912 A.2d at 719 (Raker, J., dissenting).
128. See Wrobleski v. deLara, 353 Md. 509, 517–18, 727 A.2d 930, 934 (1999) (defining a
“hired gun” as a professional who earns a large portion of his livelihood from testifying and
has an economic incentive to produce favorable results for his employer, rather than evalu-
ate the issues and testify with complete impartiality); see also MD. R. 5-616(a)(4) (“The
credibility of a witness may be attacked through questions . . . that . . . [p]rov[e] that the
witness is biased [or] interested in the outcome of the proceeding, or has a motive to
testify falsely.”); id. 5-611(b)(1) (stating that matters affecting credibility of a witness are
proper subjects of inquiry on cross-examination).
129. See Wrobleski, 353 Md. at 517, 727 A.2d at 933–34 (stating that counsel may seek to
show an expert’s bias by examining his current pay, his typical compensation for testifying
in a case, and the percentage of his annual income attributable to expert witness work);
Ager v. Balt. Transit Co., 213 Md. 414, 427–28, 132 A.2d 469, 476–77 (1957) (showing that
an expert witness’s employment history may be examined to show bias); see also Mezzanotte
Constr. Co. v. Gibons, 219 Md. 178, 181, 148 A.2d 399, 401 (1959) (explaining that counsel
may ask about an expert’s compensation, past or prospective).
130. See Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 116–17, 912 A.2d at 710–11.
131. See Med. Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc’y of Md. v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 22, 622 A.2d 103, 113
(1993) (suggesting that the primary purpose of witness questioning should not be to harass
or unduly embarrass); see also MD. R. 5-611(a) (same).
132. See Wise v. Ackerman, 76 Md. 375, 394, 25 A. 424, 427 (1892) (noting that cross-
examination may include questions pertaining to the witness’s relationship with each
party).  According to the Maryland Rules of Evidence, such a question would surely be
considered “relevant.” See MD. R. 5-401 (“Relevant evidence . . . tend[s] to make the exis-
tence of a[ ] [material] fact . . . more probable than it would be without the evidence.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  However, even though it would be relevant, the
court could still exclude such evidence if the prejudice from its admission substantially
outweighed its probative value. Id. 5-403; see id. 5-104(a) (stating that admissibility of evi-
dence shall be determined by the trial court).
133. Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 131–32, 912 A.2d at 719–20 (Raker, J., dissenting).  In other
words, Boone intended to have jurors infer that because Dr. Schretlen was willing in the
past to testify favorably for whichever party paid him, his testimony was so influenced by
the paying party’s interests in the instant case.
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money.  Specifically, the jury could have inferred that if Dr. Schretlen
minimized injuries in previous cases, he would not hesitate to mini-
mize injuries, perhaps wrongly, in this case.134
At that point, if the jury had drawn certain negative conclusions
about Dr. Schretlen and, consequently, about Dr. Goldberg, the de-
fense could not have offered rebuttal without introducing purely col-
lateral evidence and staging a “trial within a trial.”135  Unquestionably,
immense problems and increased cost would result from injecting
other collateral issues into the trial.136  Because the court could not
afford the time or expense of litigating collateral issues, Boone’s coun-
sel felt able to dance around the penumbra of allowable questions
until an objection was raised.  Thus, when combined with Boone’s
sniper comment, which indicated that Dr. Schretlen had testified as
an expert witness during the defense of a convicted murderer in a
highly publicized case, the paid minimizer question pushed the limit
of allowable impeachment questioning and was unfairly prejudicial to
Dr. Goldberg’s case.137
Not only was the questioning inflammatory and patently unfair to
Dr. Goldberg’s case, but the majority also failed to mention that
Boone’s counsel, for two reasons, appeared to have deliberately
planned to use information relating to Lee Boyd Malvo and the sniper
shootings.138  First, there was no need for Boone’s counsel to mention
the word “sniper” once Dr. Schretlen acknowledged that he knew to
134. Id. at 132, 912 A.2d at 720.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Pappas v. Fronczak, 618 N.E.2d 878, 884 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding no
abuse of discretion when the trial court stated that inquiry into an expert’s past testimonial
appearances on behalf of a certain doctor would unnecessarily lengthen the already drawn-
out proceedings and interject unrelated issues into the present case).  Undoubtedly, courts
have limited resources and seek to efficiently and expeditiously resolve legal disputes. See
MD. R. 5-102 (detailing that the purpose of the Maryland Rules of Evidence is to eliminate
unjustifiable expense and delay and resolve disputes with fairness).  However, the court’s
rigid insistence upon efficiency came at a cost of fairness.  Not only was Dr. Goldberg’s
motion for mistrial denied following Boone’s prejudicial comments, but he was not al-
lowed to defend himself, his relationship to Dr. Schretlen, or Dr. Schretlen’s testimonial
history as an expert witness because it would have interjected additional issues into the
case, thereby creating a “trial within a trial.” See Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 132, 912 A.2d at 720
(Raker, J., dissenting).
137. See Lai v. Sagle, 373 Md. 306, 322, 818 A.2d 237, 247 (2003) (finding unfair
prejudice sufficient to warrant a mistrial because comments were made only to excite and
mislead the jury); see also Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 131–32, 912 A.2d at 719–20 (Raker, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that paid minimizer questions are fundamentally different from sim-
ple questions to expose bias, aimed only at eliciting unfair prejudice in the minds of the
jurors, and are, therefore, not allowable).
138. See infra notes 139–141 and accompanying text. R
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whom counsel was referring.139  The questioning was particularly im-
proper because the reference was unrelated to the instant case and
Maryland residents on the jury would quickly associate that word with
the recent and infamous shootings.140  Second, although Boone’s
counsel may have argued that he accidentally misspoke in mentioning
the word “sniper” while questioning Dr. Schretlen, the record shows
that even after Dr. Goldberg’s counsel objected to the sniper ques-
tion, Boone’s counsel attempted to name the young defendant in-
volved—Lee Boyd Malvo—but was prevented by the court.141  Thus,
because Boone’s counsel seemed to make the sniper comments in bad
faith, the Goldberg court should have recognized that these questions
compounded the harassing and prejudicial effect of the “paid mini-
mizer” questions, and deemed both inadmissible.
B. The Goldberg Court Did Not Sufficiently Analyze the Effect or
Adequately Remedy the Prejudice Caused by Counsel’s Blatantly
Improper Statement
Instead of analyzing the extent to which the sniper question
prejudiced Dr. Goldberg in the eyes of the jury, the court inappropri-
ately dismissed the issue because the question was asked only once
and the trial court sustained the objection.142  The majority stated that
Boone’s sniper question “could have created an atmosphere of disgust
on the part of the jury” and “could be construed as nothing more than
an appeal to the jurors’ passions and prejudices.”143  Yet, the majority
approved of the trial court’s refusal to grant a new trial.144  Although a
mistrial is often appropriate when counsel makes repeated inflam-
matory statements,145 the court refused to acknowledge that it is also
139. See Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 104, 912 A.2d at 704 (reflecting Dr. Schretlen’s assent to
Mr. Boone’s counsel’s question regarding the sniper case).
140. See Katherine Shaver, Judge Rejects Media Bid to Open Hearing for Juvenile Sniper Sus-
pect, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2002, at A1 (noting that public interest in the Washington, D.C.
area sniper case was “enormous”); cf. Tierco Md., Inc. v. Williams, 381 Md. 378, 410, 849
A.2d 504, 523 (2004) (finding that an irrelevant and unrelated statement made to incite
the jury is improper).
141. Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 105, 912 A.2d at 704.
142. Id. at 120, 912 A.2d at 713.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. See id. (summarily upholding the trial judge’s decision with little analysis in support
of a finding of no prejudice).
145. See Tierco Md., 381 Md. at 384, 414, 849 A.2d at 508, 526 (stating that a new trial
should have been granted when counsel spoke of race and discrimination sixty-three dif-
ferent times without cause).
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sometimes appropriate when counsel makes only one unprovoked, in-
cendiary comment.146
1. Although It Correctly Held that Counsel’s Comments Prejudiced
Dr. Goldberg, the Court Did Not Adequately Consider the
Extent of the Prejudicial Impact to Dr. Goldberg’s Case,
Nor Fully Weigh That Impact Against Any
Curative Action Taken by the Trial Court
The high court recognized the settled principle that the trial
court’s decision merited deference; however, as a result, the court
failed to make any examination of whether the sniper comment,
under DeMay v. Carper, raised the trial to the level of a blatant, excep-
tional case warranting reversal of the trial judge’s decision.147  To de-
termine whether this was a blatant, exceptional case indicative of an
abuse of discretion, the court should have explicitly utilized the two-
step Garrett test.148  Following the first step of the test, the court prop-
erly concluded that Boone’s improper questions prejudiced Dr.
Goldberg.149  However, the court failed to adequately analyze the ex-
tent of the prejudice and its impact on the jury, as is required before
the second step of the Garrett test—the balancing analysis—can take
place.150
Given its recent decisions in Evans, Lai, and Tierco, Md., the court
failed to adequately utilize one of its key tools, the Guesfeird factors, for
examining the prejudicial effect of the sniper comment, as required
by the first step of Garrett.  Even though Guesfeird made clear that no
one factor was dispositive,151 the majority dismissed the prejudicial im-
146. See Lai v. Sagle, 373 Md. 306, 324–25, 818 A.2d 237, 248–49 (2003) (finding that
one reference during an opening statement regarding prior malpractice suits filed against
a doctor was sufficient to prejudice the proceedings so that no curative instruction made
by the court could undo the taint).
147. Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 120, 912 A.2d at 713 (failing to measure the extent of
prejudice towards Dr. Goldberg and instead merely stating that the sniper comment could
have disgusted jurors).
148. The Garrett test is appropriate for courts to use when determining abuse of discre-
tion in denying a motion for mistrial. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343
Md. 500, 518, 682 A.2d 1143, 1151 (1996) (articulating a two-step test to determine
whether denial of a motion for mistrial is appropriate, asking (1) whether, and to what
extent, the moving party was prejudiced, and (2) whether the curative measures imple-
mented by the trial judge were sufficient to overcome that prejudice).
149. See Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 120, 912 A.2d at 713 (“[T]he line of questioning about
the sniper case . . . [was] improper . . . and . . . prejudicial . . . .”).
150. See Garrett, 343 Md. at 518, 582 A.2d at 1151.
151. See Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 659, 480 A.2d 800, 803 (1984) (articulating
factors relevant to analysis of prejudicial effect and emphasizing that no one factor is
dispositive).
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pact of the sniper comment altogether for one single reason—because
Boone’s counsel made only one reference to the sniper trial and did
not repeat it.152  Ignoring precedent, the court opened the floodgates
for attorneys to carefully craft inflammatory, prejudicial comments to
be used—only once—at the most advantageous time at trial.
Instead, as per the Guesfeird factors, the court should have paid
close attention to the purpose of the statement, the person who made
the statement, whether it was intentional or inadvertent, and whether
an inference could be drawn from it.153  Application of the factors to
these facts demonstrates that the sniper trial was not mistakenly men-
tioned by an unknowing witness, but rather Boone’s counsel referred
to it in a calculated attack on Dr. Schretlen.154  Indeed, although the
comment was only made once, Boone’s counsel demonstrated bad
faith by attempting, in clear view of the jurors, to name Lee Boyd
Malvo and emphasize that Dr. Goldberg was linked to him.155  Fur-
thermore, the jurors may have drawn further negative inferences as to
Dr. Goldberg and Dr. Schretlen after viewing their vehement objec-
tions to the minimizer and sniper comments.156  When all of these
factors are taken together, even though Dr. Schretlen was not the
152. Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 120, 912 A.2d at 713 (“[A]lthough the reference to one [of]
the ‘snipers’ in Mr. Boone’s counsel’s question clearly could have created an atmosphere
of disgust on the part of the jury for Dr. Schretlen’s willingness to testify thusly in the
sniper case, it was asked only once of the expert and was never mentioned again.”).  The
majority ignored the fact that, if he was ready and willing to name Lee Boyd Malvo as the
young man in the sniper trial, Boone’s counsel probably would have made other refer-
ences to the sniper case had it not been for the sustaining of the objection. See id. at 105,
912 A.2d at 704.
153. Guesfeird, 300 Md. at 659, 480 A.2d at 803.
154. Compare Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 105, 912 A.2d at 704 (inflammatory comment im-
properly made by plaintiff’s counsel while questioning an expert witness), with Guesfeird, 300
Md. at 656–57, 480 A.2d at 801–02 (inadmissible statement made by teenage rape victim
while being questioned on the witness stand).
Although this case did not explicitly involve sensitive issues like race, nationality, or
religion, some courts would consider an attorney’s mention of a recent regional killing
spree to be enough of a hot-button issue to be per se grounds for granting a motion for
mistrial. See Tex. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Tex. App. 1990)
(finding incurable error exists when counsel suggests that a jury feel animus toward a wit-
ness because of a sensitive societal issue).
155. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing Boone’s counsel’s deliberate R
attempt to impeach Dr. Schretlen through inadmissible means).
156. See Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 104–05, 912 A.2d at 703–04 (stating that Dr. Goldberg’s
counsel replied to both questions by saying, “[o]bjection, Your Honor,” and that Dr.
Schretlen contested the sniper question by ardently stating, “[t]hat is absolutely incorrect
and outrageous”).
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principal witness in the case, the court should have determined that
the prejudicial impact of the improper comments was substantial.157
Next, for the second step of the Garrett test, the court did not
sufficiently weigh the prejudicial impact of Dr. Goldberg being linked,
albeit indirectly, to an infamous, convicted murderer158 against the
trial judge’s curative measure of merely sustaining the objection.159
Given the recent nature and geographical proximity of the widely
publicized sniper shootings,160 the stigma attached when one is associ-
ated with a notorious convicted criminal,161 and the fact that the court
157. See Med. Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc’y of Md. v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 15–16, 622 A.2d 103, 110
(1993) (finding counsel’s comments to an expert witness sufficiently prejudicial to warrant
a mistrial even though the expert was not the principal witness in the case and, in fact, had
no direct involvement with the actual claim at issue and testified only after the claims
adjuster who worked directly on the claim testified during the first three days of trial).
158. Lee Boyd Malvo was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole for six
murders he committed in October 2002 in Montgomery County, Maryland. Young Sniper Is
Sentenced to 6 Life Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at A28.  In addition, Malvo has been
sentenced to life in prison in Virginia for shootings there. Id. These murders were part of
“a three-week series of sniper attacks that terrorized the Washington[, D.C.] area.” Id.
159. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 518, 682 A.2d 1143,
1151 (1996) (quoting ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 407, 667 A.2d 116, 151–52
(1995)) (stating that if a motion for mistrial is denied, on appeal the court must weigh the
prejudice to the defendant against the curative action of the court).
160. Eight of the fourteen sniper attacks occurred in Montgomery County, Maryland,
2002 Area Sniper Shootings, WashingtonPost.com, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/metro/daily/oct02/snipershootings.htm (last visited May 5, 2008), the same county in
which Dr. Goldberg practiced and the trial occurred.  The shootings began on October 2,
2002, and continued until October 22, 2002. Id. The two convicted shooters were arrested
on October 24, 2002.  Tom Jackman & David Snyder, Va. Will Send Snipers to Md. for Prosecu-
tion, WASH. POST, May 11, 2005, at A1. For more information on the shootings, see The
D.C.-Area Sniper Case, Online NewsHour, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/
sniper/ (last visited May 5, 2008).
161. Although the jurors would likely have associated Dr. Schretlen with Lee Boyd
Malvo, they were not given any explanation as to exactly how Dr. Schretlen was tied to
Malvo, thus leaving the question open to their own imaginations.  If the jurors were able to
conclude that Dr. Schretlen had testified as an expert witness for Malvo, which he had,
they may have decided that because Dr. Schretlen testified for “the bad guy” in the past, he
was probably testifying for “the bad guy” again in Dr. Goldberg’s case. See Rainville v. State,
328 Md. 398, 407, 614 A.2d 949, 953 (1992) (citing Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 364, 535
A.2d 445, 453 (1988)).  For example, in Rainville, the court stated that a mother’s remark
that the defendant was “in jail for what he had done to Michael” was particularly prejudi-
cial where defendant had not been convicted of assaulting her son Michael, but was await-
ing trial on those charges, and the court also found it highly likely that the jury assumed
that “what [the defendant] had done to Michael” was similar to the crime committed
against the plaintiff. Id.
Furthermore, if the jurors did not know to whom Boone’s counsel referred, they were
left to wonder who the sniper was, how he was tied to Dr. Schretlen, what that had to do
with the instant case, why Dr. Goldberg’s counsel would object to such a comment, and
why Dr. Goldberg’s counsel and Dr. Schretlen reacted so negatively to the comment.
Thus, not only did the lack of any curative instruction following the sniper comment
prejudice Dr. Goldberg, but the jury was also left in the dark and likely confused.
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gave no explanation or curative instruction to the jury regarding the
sniper comment beyond sustaining the objection, this could very well
have been a blatant, exceptional case, thereby permitting the appel-
late court to reverse the trial judge’s denial of the motion for mis-
trial.162  Although the trial judge was in the unique position of being
able to observe the reactions of the jurors first-hand,163 at the very
minimum he should have promulgated a strong curative instruction.
Even if, however, a curative instruction could have been issued in
an attempt to curtail prejudice toward Dr. Goldberg, such an instruc-
tion may still have been inadequate.164  Furthermore, jurors may have
believed that because the trial judge made no curative instruction af-
ter sustaining the objection, the disputed comments could still be
taken into account in the jury’s decision.165  Thus, even though a cur-
ative instruction by the trial judge would have been better than no
corrective action at all, the surest recourse to prevent unreasonable
prejudice was to grant a mistrial, thereby ensuring that Dr. Goldberg
was not denied a fair trial because of a tainted jury.
2. The Goldberg Court Failed to Consider Alternative Remedies to
Cure the Prejudice to Dr. Goldberg
Boone’s counsel argued that, because the list of Dr. Schretlen’s
past testimonial appearances included the Malvo sniper case, Dr.
Goldberg’s counsel should have filed a motion in limine to prevent the
introduction of evidence relating to the sniper trial.166  However, by
making this argument, it is evident that Boone’s counsel knew, or
should have known, that the evidence would be objectionable; never-
162. See DeMay v. Carper, 247 Md. 535, 540, 233 A.2d 765, 768 (1967) (explaining that
the trial judge’s choice of cure, and decision as to its effect, may be reversed if it is an
exceptional, blatant case).
163. See State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 278, 604 A.2d 489, 493 (1992) (observing that
the trial judge has the best view of what takes place in his courtroom and is thus best able
to evaluate prejudice); Hickman v. State, 76 Md. App. 111, 120, 543 A.2d 870, 875 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1988) (same).
164. See Bradley v. State, 333 Md. 593, 613, 636 A.2d 999, 1009 (1994) (“[L]imiting
instructions are inadequate where the danger of prejudice is great and it is simply unrealis-
tic to believe that the jury would adhere to the refined distinctions demanded by the limit-
ing instruction[s].” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Benoit, 586 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992))).
165. Cf. Pingatore v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 419 F.2d 1138, 1143 (6th Cir. 1969)
(finding that failure to give even a curative instruction as to improper comments made in
court could enhance and reinforce the prejudice already drawn by jurors by giving them
the impression that the comments could be considered in their verdict).
166. Goldberg II, 396 Md. 94, 106–07, 912 A.2d 698, 705 (2006).
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theless, he unjustifiably chose to offer it anyway.167  Boone’s counsel
could have moved in limine to ascertain the admissibility of the evi-
dence, yet instead kept quiet so that he could spring the evidence on
the jury when it was most likely to harass Dr. Schretlen, embarrass Dr.
Goldberg, and inflame the jury.  The majority, therefore, improperly
failed to question Boone’s counsel’s actions and should have rejected
a bright-line rule that would require defendants to move in limine to
block any and all questionable evidence as unwieldy and unfair.168
Such a rule puts a significant burden on the defendant, when the pro-
ponent of the evidence is in a better position to know what the evi-
dence is and how it will be introduced.
Various rules have been proposed to help combat the difficult
decision appellate courts face in trying to determine whether to deny
or grant a motion for mistrial.  Commentators have suggested that
states would benefit greatly by having the subject matter of mistrials
codified.169  By establishing clear, rational rules of law for when a mis-
trial must be granted in both civil and criminal cases, litigators and
judges alike would benefit and trials would become more
predictable.170
In Maryland, when counsel desires to introduce extremely ques-
tionable and potentially prejudicial evidence, the only proper proce-
dure is to require the introducing party to file a motion in limine and
have the evidence approved initially outside the jury’s presence.171
167. Cf. Med. Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc’y of Md. v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 24, 622 A.2d 103, 114
(1993) (stating that plaintiff’s counsel ought to be reticent to introduce evidence without
making a motion in limine when they have reason to suspect the evidence might be consid-
ered improper, and that even the most dedicated advocate should recognize the likelihood
that improper evidence will be inadmissible and potentially cause a mistrial).
168. See Lai v. Sagle, 373 Md. 306, 325, 818 A.2d 237, 249 (2003) (indicating that a
proponent of questionable evidence ought to secure a motion in limine outside the presence
of the jury).
169. See Frederick C. Moss, Rethinking Texas Evidence Rule 103, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 503,
564–65 (2004) (advocating a Texas evidence rule requiring that a mistrial be granted in all
jury trials in which the verdict has been affected by improper influences).
170. See generally id.
171. Lai, 373 Md. at 325, 818 A.2d at 249.  Although the improper evidence in Lai was
introduced in an opening statement, the timing of when the evidence is introduced should
not be determinative of whether to grant a mistrial.  To follow such an approach would
allow courts to determine a defendant’s fate based on the point in trial at which the plain-
tiff decides to unleash inappropriate comments or questions.  Such a rule would unequivo-
cally deny defendants a fair trial in the name of efficiency and conservation of judicial
resources, while the Maryland Rules of Evidence only seek to avoid unjustifiable expense.
See MD. R. 5-102 (stating that the rules of evidence are necessary “to secure fairness in
administration, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined”).
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This approach places the onus on the party proffering the evidence to
either secure a positive ruling on a motion in limine before making
potentially objectionable statements, or to simply use the evidence,
regardless of its impropriety, and risk facing a mistrial.172
C. Public Policy and Equitable Considerations Dictate that when the
Prejudice Caused by Incendiary Comments Is So Pervasive as to
Excite or Mislead the Jury, the Court Should Grant a New
Trial on All Issues
Due to the provocative nature of Boone’s counsel’s statements
and the damaging prejudice inflicted upon Dr. Goldberg’s case, a new
trial should have been granted, not only on the issue of damages, but
on both the issues of damages and liability.173  If the purpose of a
reference is to inflame the passions of the jury, the reference is im-
proper and prejudicial and warrants a mistrial.174  In considering on
appeal whether a mistrial should be granted for both liability and
damages, the court must grant a new trial on both issues when a com-
ment is so inflammatory that its prejudicial effect might inflame the
passions of even one juror to the point that she cannot fairly weigh
the issues.175  The rationale for this rule is that once a prejudicial com-
ment has affected even one juror in a significant way, it cannot be said
The Garrett court, in denying the defendant’s motion for mistrial, emphasized the fact
that a four-month trial, analysis of hundreds of documents, and hours of closing arguments
would be for naught if a mistrial was granted on the basis of a few incendiary remarks by
counsel. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 519–20, 682 A.2d
1143, 1152 (1996).  Even if the amount of resources the court had used was determinative
in denying a motion for mistrial, this factor should not have prevented the Goldberg court
from granting the motion when the inflammatory comments were made on day six of an
eight-day trial.  Brief of Appellee at 11, Goldberg II, 396 Md. 94, 912 A.2d 698 (2006) (No.
21), 2006 WL 2471664.
172. See Lai, 373 Md. at 317, 818 A.2d at 244 (“[T]he real purpose of a motion in limine
is to give the trial judge notice of the movant’s position so as to avoid the introduction of
damaging evidence which may irretrievably infect the fairness of the trial.” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 356, 535 A.2d 445, 449 (1988))).
173. Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 132–33, 912 A.2d at 720 (Raker, J., dissenting).
174. Tierco Md., Inc. v. Williams, 381 Md. 378, 410, 849 A.2d 504, 523 (2004).  Although
it may be difficult, if not impossible, for the trial judge to consistently identify counsel’s
purpose in making an inflammatory comment, the judge should consider the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the comment, including but not limited to: whether the
jury could draw an inference from the comment, the point in the trial at which the com-
ment was made, previous arguments made by counsel during the trial, and whether the
comment was repeated or expounded upon after it had been deemed inappropriate. See
Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 659, 480 A.2d 800, 803 (1984) (detailing factors the court
may consider in determining the prejudicial impact of inappropriate evidence).
175. See Stickley v. Chisholm, 136 Md. App. 305, 316, 765 A.2d 662, 669 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2001) (quoting M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Grant of New Trial on Issue of Liability
Alone, Without Retrial of Issue of Damages, 34 A.L.R.2D 988, 990 (1954)) (stating that a partial
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that the defendant will receive a fair trial.176  For instance, even after a
trial judge sustains an objection or issues a curative instruction to dis-
regard an improper comment by counsel, many jurors will have a
hard time disregarding what they have already heard.177  Moreover,
once a statement has tainted a juror as to one issue, it is difficult, if not
impossible, for the court to be assured that the juror has not been
affected as to all issues in a case.178
In addition to an agitative comment’s detrimental impact on the
jury, given the American legal system’s emphasis on providing defend-
ants with a fair trial and due process of law,179 the determination to
grant a complete or partial mistrial for improper statements should
not turn on how much of the case has already been litigated or the
expense of a new trial.180  Because Dr. Goldberg maintained his inno-
cence as to liability throughout the trial,181 and Boone’s counsel’s in-
cendiary statement unfairly prejudiced Dr. Goldberg,182 a new trial
should have been granted on the issues of both liability and
damages.183
new trial on some of the issues can be ordered only if there is no confusion, inconve-
nience, or prejudice to the rights of any party).
176. After all, “[o]nce [a] skunk [i]s tossed into the jury box, the trial need[s] abort-
ing.”  Ayers Estate v. Hernando County, 706 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
177. See Dep’t of Transp. v. First Bank of Schaumburg, 631 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992) (“A party is entitled to a fair trial, free from prejudicial conduct of counsel who
undertakes to supply facts or to draw inferences not based upon the evidence in the re-
cord, and prejudice is not necessarily cured where the trial court has sustained objections to
improper questioning.” (emphasis added)).  In this case, sustaining Dr. Goldberg’s objec-
tion, but nevertheless failing to give a curative jury instruction, likely did little to reinforce
the jury’s need to disregard the improper comments. See text accompanying note 165. R
178. Even though Dr. Goldberg’s counsel called Dr. Schretlen as a witness solely as to
the damages issue, the court should grant a new trial on all issues if doing so is necessary to
bring about a more just result. See Stickley, 136 Md. App. at 317, 765 A.2d at 669
(“[A]lthough an error affects one issue only, a new trial on all issues is to be granted where
this will best subserve the ends of justice.”).
179. See MD. R. 5-102 (stating the purpose of the Maryland Rules of Evidence to be the
ascertainment of truth and maintenance of fairness in trials).
180. See supra note 171. R
181. Cf. Goldberg I, 167 Md. App. 410, 417, 893 A.2d 625, 628–29 (Ct. Spec. App. 2006)
(showing that in his initial appeal Dr. Goldberg sought a new trial on the issue of
negligence).
182. See Goldberg II, 396 Md. 94, 120, 912 A.2d 698, 713 (2006) (finding prejudicial ef-
fects, but not to the level that would require a mistrial).
183. Id. at 133, 912 A.2d at 720 (Raker, J., dissenting); see Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 512 F.2d 276, 282–83 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that if there is a reasonable probability
that both issues of liability and damages were influenced by inadmissible evidence, then a
new trial should be granted on both issues).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Goldberg v. Boone, the Court of Appeals properly found that Dr.
Goldberg had been prejudiced by opposing counsel’s inappropriate
questioning.184  In the name of efficiency and frugality, however, the
court did not grant Dr. Goldberg the relief that fairness demanded.185
The court’s cursory analysis of Boone’s questioning of Dr. Goldberg’s
expert witness failed to recognize that, although Boone intended to
show Dr. Schretlen’s bias, the improper comments by counsel went
beyond the allowable scope of impeachment questioning.186  Moreo-
ver, the court should have discussed alternative standards for remedy-
ing the prejudice Dr. Goldberg faced, including the use of a motion in
limine, the grant of an adequate curative instruction, or the codifica-
tion of the subject matter of mistrials.187  In the future, when a trial is
tainted by a highly improper comment at any point in the proceed-
ings and the court cannot be sure that the jury will be unprejudiced in
reaching its verdict on each distinct issue, a new trial should be
granted on all issues.188
BRIGHAM J. LUNDBERG
184. See Goldberg II, 396 Md. at 120, 912 A.2d at 713.
185. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. R
186. See supra Part IV.A.
187. See supra Part IV.B.
188. See supra Part IV.C.
